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Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution
Author(s) -
Carter J. Adam
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12040
Subject(s) - luck , epistemic virtue , epistemology , virtue , philosophy , meta epistemology , epistemology of wikipedia , social epistemology
R obust V irtue E pistemology ( RVE ) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti‐luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti‐luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather , but more so , than luck.