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The Role of Freedom in D escartes' Ethics of Belief
Author(s) -
Mihali Andreea
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12026
Subject(s) - praise , blame , order (exchange) , epistemology , cooperative principle , philosophy , psychology , law and economics , social psychology , sociology , business , linguistics , grice , pragmatics , finance
This article brings to light the role and importance of D escartes' concept of freedom for his ethics of belief. For D escartes, I argue, correctly assigning epistemic praise/blame means tracking authentic freedoms: ascertaining whether an act of assent is spontaneous or perverse both before and after eliciting the act of will. Authentic spontaneity ensures that the agent receives praise for his epistemic accomplishment, which includes the right results as well as the right order of steps. Authentic perversity leads to the agent being blamed for not accepting the truth while fully aware of the gravity of the gesture.