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Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency
Author(s) -
Breyer Daniel S.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12011
Subject(s) - counterexample , agency (philosophy) , principal–agent problem , cognition , positive economics , epistemology , economics , psychology , philosophy , finance , mathematics , discrete mathematics , corporate governance , neuroscience
According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent‐based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, however, for one lesson that emerges is that credit theories are theories of subjective justification, not theories of knowledge.