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‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases
Author(s) -
Stone Jim
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12006
Subject(s) - luck , epistemology , philosophy
This article argues that justified true beliefs in G ettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ G ettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the G ettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of G ettier cases, what is? Second, what do G ettier cases reveal about knowledge?
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