Structural Impediments, Domestic Politics, and Nuclear Diplomacy in Post‐ K im Il‐sung N orth K orea

This article uses theoretical insights from neoclassical realism to explain how the end of the C old W ar shaped N orth K orea's domestic political structures and foreign‐policy strategies. It suggests that political leaders are uniquely positioned at the nexus of domestic politics and international politics and employ two different strategies: utilizing international politics for domestic political gain and mobilizing domestic resources to further international ambitions. In the politicking process, political leaders are interested in maximizing both the state security and the regime security; leaders’ concern for regime security outweighs their protection of the national interest when threats to the regime appear more serious. In N orth K orea, the end of the C old W ar forced K im J ong‐il to adopt military‐first politics, in which the political power and authority of the K orean W orker's P arty waned and the K orean P eople's A rmy gained the upper hand in the governing process. In foreign policy, K im J ong‐il and his son Jong‐un pursued nuclear weapons to maximize national security at a lower cost and to secure the legitimacy of their rule through successful nuclear tests and mobilization of international threats.