z-logo
Premium
Collaborative gaming: When principals and agents agree to game the system
Author(s) -
Pierre Jon,
Fine Licht Jenny
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/padm.12720
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , incentive , argument (complex analysis) , government (linguistics) , service (business) , public service , public service motivation , business , public relations , computer science , public sector , marketing , economics , microeconomics , political science , sociology , social science , biochemistry , chemistry , linguistics , philosophy , economy
This paper presents a previously unexplored type of gaming of performance data, collaborative gaming, where the performance measurement system incentivizes the executive and an agency to game collaboratively. The paper shows how overlapping incentives between government departments and agencies to present successful implementation of programs can drive collaboration to modify performance targets and/or performance measurements. The argument is illustrated by two brief case studies of collaboration between the Swedish Department of Employment and the Swedish Public Employment Service in the implementation of labor‐market programs.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here