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Identity, threat aversion, and civil servants' policy preferences: Evidence from the European Parliament
Author(s) -
Kuehnhanss Colin R.,
Murdoch Zuzana,
Geys Benny,
Heyndels Bruno
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/padm.12348
Subject(s) - parliament , civil servants , argument (complex analysis) , preference , identity (music) , perception , identification (biology) , empirical evidence , stochastic game , political science , social psychology , public economics , economics , psychology , microeconomics , politics , law , physics , acoustics , biochemistry , chemistry , botany , philosophy , epistemology , neuroscience , biology
Distinct policy options are typically characterized by a number of advantages (or ‘opportunities’) and disadvantages (or ‘threats’). The preference for one option over another depends on how individuals within an organization perceive these opportunities and threats. In this article, we argue that individuals' identification with an organization's core aims and objectives constitutes a key determinant of this perception. We propose that stronger identification shifts individuals' attention towards potential threats rather than opportunities in the payoff distribution, encouraging avoidance of negative outcomes. Moreover, we argue that this ‘prevention focus’ in individuals' motivational basis will be stronger under negative than under positive selection strategies. An original survey experiment with civil servants in the European Parliament finds significant evidence supporting the empirical implications of our argument.