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ACCOUNTABILITY AFTER STRUCTURAL DISAGGREGATION: COMPARING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS
Author(s) -
OVERMAN SJORS,
VAN GENUGTEN MARIEKE,
VAN THIEL SANDRA
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/padm.12185
Subject(s) - accountability , incentive , audit , agency (philosophy) , public administration , business , accounting , public sector , political science , economics , sociology , law , social science , microeconomics
New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expected to replace traditional accountability instruments in NPM reforms. We test this expectation by looking at the accountability arrangements of semi‐autonomous agencies as a typical example of NPM reforms. Our findings are based on survey data on 342 agencies in six countries. We identify four types of accountability arrangements in semi‐autonomous agencies, in line with the four trajectories of public management reform identified by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). Accountability relations between agencies and ministries are determined by country‐specific administrative regimes, types of agency, and to a lesser extent, agencies' policy fields. We identify new avenues for theory and research into the effects of reforms on accountability in the public sector, and on semi‐autonomous agencies in particular.