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Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms
Author(s) -
Castro Vítor,
Martins Rodrigo
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
oxford bulletin of economics and statistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.131
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1468-0084
pISSN - 0305-9049
DOI - 10.1111/obes.12290
Subject(s) - boom , economics , politics , monetary economics , developing country , political instability , central bank , panel data , independence (probability theory) , monetary policy , logit , macroeconomics , econometrics , political science , economic growth , statistics , mathematics , environmental engineering , law , engineering
The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.