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Self‐screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program
Author(s) -
Häkkinen Skans Iida,
Johansson Per
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
oxford bulletin of economics and statistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.131
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1468-0084
pISSN - 0305-9049
DOI - 10.1111/obes.12230
Subject(s) - moral hazard , identification (biology) , actuarial science , estimation , parental monitoring , psychology , economics , developmental psychology , microeconomics , incentive , botany , management , biology
Monitoring and screening have been shown to be important to reduce moral hazard in social insurances. This paper empirically investigates whether monitoring in the Swedish temporary parental benefit program affects future benefit take‐up. Identification is based on the fact that parents’ benefit applications are monitored randomly by the insurer. The estimation results show that parents who are monitored are less likely to apply again in the near future.