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Taxes and Benefits: Two Options to Cheat on the State
Author(s) -
Halla Martin,
Schneider Friedrich G.
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
oxford bulletin of economics and statistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.131
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1468-0084
pISSN - 0305-9049
DOI - 10.1111/obes.12024
Subject(s) - cheating , economics , tax evasion , proxy (statistics) , state (computer science) , public economics , microeconomics , survey data collection , social psychology , psychology , statistics , mathematics , algorithm , machine learning , computer science
In this article we study the social norms to abstain from cheating on the state via benefit fraud and tax evasion. We interpret these norms (called benefit morale and tax morale) as moral goods, and derive testable hypotheses on whether their demand is determined by prices. Employing a large survey data set from OECD‐member countries we provide robust evidence that the demand responds to price proxy variables as predicted by theory. The main general conclusion of this article is that social norms (which are widely accepted as determinants of individual economic behaviour) are themselves influenced by economic factors.