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Linguistic meanings as cognitive instructions
Author(s) -
Knowlton Tyler,
Hunter Tim,
Odic Darko,
Wellwood Alexis,
Halberda Justin,
Pietroski Paul,
Lidz Jeffrey
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
annals of the new york academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.712
H-Index - 248
eISSN - 1749-6632
pISSN - 0077-8923
DOI - 10.1111/nyas.14618
Subject(s) - sentence , meaning (existential) , cognition , linguistics , psychology , mental representation , natural (archaeology) , matching (statistics) , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , computer science , history , neuroscience , psychotherapist , philosophy , statistics , mathematics , archaeology
Natural languages like English connect pronunciations with meanings. Linguistic pronunciations can be described in ways that relate them to our motor system (e.g., to the movement of our lips and tongue). But how do linguistic meanings relate to our nonlinguistic cognitive systems? As a case study, we defend an explicit proposal about the meaning of most by comparing it to the closely related more : whereas more expresses a comparison between two independent subsets, most expresses a subset–superset comparison. Six experiments with adults and children demonstrate that these subtle differences between their meanings influence how participants organize and interrogate their visual world. In otherwise identical situations, changing the word from most to more affects preferences for picture–sentence matching (experiments 1–2), scene creation (experiments 3–4), memory for visual features (experiment 5), and accuracy on speeded truth judgments (experiment 6). These effects support the idea that the meanings of more and most are mental representations that provide detailed instructions to conceptual systems.