Open AccessA simple model to bridge Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity
Author(s) -
Soedomo Sudarsono
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/nrm.12205
Subject(s) - comity , tragedy of the commons , tragedy (event) , common pool resource , simple (philosophy) , law and economics , property (philosophy) , resource (disambiguation) , commons , political science , economics , philosophy , computer science , sociology , law , microeconomics , epistemology , social science , jurisdiction , computer network
Abstract Triggered by the article titled “The tragedy of the commons” by Hardin, a collectively‐managed resource (CMR) emerges and becomes a highly fruitful discussion topic. Furthermore, Ostrom augments the topic and demonstrates that the utilization of a CMR should not always result in a tragedy. However, the theory used to justify Hardin's tragedy differs from the one used to justify Ostrom's comity; Hardin's tragedy is justified by one‐shot prisoners' dilemma (PD), while Ostrom's comity is justified by infinitely repeated PD. The discussion in this study shows that Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity can be supported by the same theory. An infinitely repeated PD complemented with a likelihood of making an error is used to reach the conclusion that the occurrences of Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity are just a matter of probability. Recommendations for Resource ManagersTo avoid as far as possible placing divisible resources under the common property regime. To develop effective monitoring systems for resource management under the common property regime to stop deviations as early as possible. To facilitate resource users involved in resource utilization under the common property regime to meet and to communicate regularly to increase mutual trust.