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Varieties of Cognitive Integration
Author(s) -
Carter J. Adam,
Kallestrup Jesper
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12288
Subject(s) - cognitive architecture , cognition , functionalism (philosophy of mind) , worry , cognitive science , psychology , cognitive systems , epistemology , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , neuroscience , anxiety , psychiatry
Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration— cluster‐model functionalism —which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.