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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism *
Author(s) -
Pettigrew Richard
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12286
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , permissive , philosophy , mathematical economics , economics , epistemology , medicine , virology
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which determines the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Hedden (2013) argues that Ramsey's Thesis is wrong. He claims that Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) determines those prices, and it often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even Hedden should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.