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Explanation and Manipulation 1
Author(s) -
PrescottCouch Alexander
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12202
Subject(s) - causation , counterfactual thinking , epistemology , focus (optics) , counterfactual conditional , causal structure , metaphysics , causal model , causal reasoning , abnormality , psychology , causal inference , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , mathematics , cognition , econometrics , statistics , physics , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , optics
Abstract I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how law‐based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences.