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Practical Know‐Wh[Note 1. Ideas included in this paper were presented at talks ...]
Author(s) -
Farkas Katalin
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12152
Subject(s) - possession (linguistics) , need to know , attribution , epistemology , psychology , computer science , social psychology , philosophy , linguistics , computer security
Abstract The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know‐how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know‐that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know‐how” attributions, but also about some cases of so‐called “know‐wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge‐wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know‐wh.