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Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’
Author(s) -
Gustafsson Johan E.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12122
Subject(s) - value (mathematics) , feature (linguistics) , epistemology , mathematical economics , computer science , linguistics , mathematics , philosophy , machine learning
Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.