Premium
Truthier Than Thou: Truth, Supertruth and Probability of Truth
Author(s) -
Smith Nicholas J.J.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12108
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , coherence theory of truth , thou , logical truth , pragmatic theory of truth , computer science , epistemology , classical logic , semantic theory of truth , truth condition , focus (optics) , philosophical logic , ground truth , artificial intelligence , philosophy , programming language , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , theology , optics
Different formal tools are useful for different purposes. For example, when it comes to modelling degrees of belief, probability theory is a better tool than classical logic; when it comes to modelling the truth of mathematical claims, classical logic is a better tool than probability theory. In this paper I focus on a widely used formal tool and argue that it does not provide a good model of a phenomenon of which many think it does provide a good model: I shall argue that while supervaluationism may provide a model of probability of truth, or of assertability, it cannot provide a good model of truth—supertruth cannot be truth. The core of the argument is that an adequate model of truth must render certain connectives truth‐functional (at least in certain circumstances)—and supervaluationism does not do so (in those circumstances).