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A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente
Author(s) -
Hansen Nat
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12103
Subject(s) - objectivism , argument (complex analysis) , subjectivism , variation (astronomy) , interpersonal communication , epistemology , psychology , philosophy , social psychology , medicine , physics , astrophysics
I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez‐Torrente 2016).
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