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Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck
Author(s) -
Carter J. Adam,
Pritchard Duncan
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12054
Subject(s) - luck , epistemology , intellectualism , descriptive knowledge , philosophy
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011 a ; 2011 b ; Brogaard 2008 b ; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.