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Davidson's Interpretations: The Step Not Taken
Author(s) -
Dresner Eli
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12040
Subject(s) - ascription , quine , interpretation (philosophy) , section (typography) , epistemology , action (physics) , philosophy , preference , linguistics , psychology , computer science , mathematics , physics , quantum mechanics , operating system , statistics
In the first section of this paper I follow an important trajectory in the development of Davidson's notion of radical interpretation: From being interpretationally concerned only with language, like Quine's radical translation that precedes it, through involving the ascription of belief in increasingly complex ways, to finally incorporating desire and preference. In the second section of the paper I show that Davidson falls short of incorporating non‐linguistic action in radical interpretation, I assess his motivations for doing so, and I criticize these motivations. In the third and final section I propose a unified interpretation scheme for language, action and mind.