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Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind
Author(s) -
Edwards Kevan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12009
Subject(s) - philosophy of language , epistemology , philosophy of mind , style (visual arts) , cognition , psychology , cognitive science , philosophy , metaphysics , archaeology , neuroscience , history
Abstract This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference‐based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke‐style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference‐based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions in philosophy of mind and other branches of the cognitive sciences.