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Functionalism and The Independence Problems
Author(s) -
Bradley Darren
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/nous.12007
Subject(s) - functionalism (philosophy of mind) , philosophy , reductionism , epistemology , sociology
The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that functional properties that are defined in terms of their causes and effects are not sufficiently independent of those purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out—in terms of necessary connections, conceptual connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism. Functionalism A functional property is a property that is characterized in terms of what it does or how it relates to other things. That is, functional properties are individuated by their causal profile. Functionalism about a domain (e.g. economics, psychology) is the view that the properties of the domain are functional properties. Functionalism is a general strategy in the philosophy of science for connecting higher level sciences like psychology or economics to lower level sciences like physics. For a familiar and idealized example from psychology, suppose that pain 1 is completely characterized as the property that causes wincing. 2 If so, pain is a functional property and pain causes wincing is a functional law (Putnam 1960, Fodor 1968). 3