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Transitions from Infinite to Finite Games as Critical Moments
Author(s) -
Donohue William A.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
negotiation journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.238
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1571-9979
pISSN - 0748-4526
DOI - 10.1111/nejo.12313
Subject(s) - negotiation , outcome (game theory) , transition (genetics) , function (biology) , set (abstract data type) , moment (physics) , game theory , mathematical economics , non cooperative game , finite set , computer science , law and economics , political science , mathematics , sociology , law , physics , mathematical analysis , biochemistry , chemistry , classical mechanics , evolutionary biology , biology , gene , programming language
This theory article argues that negotiation is often played as a finite game that consists of a known number of players using an agreed‐upon set of rules (when parties are bargaining in good faith) aimed at achieving a specific outcome. However, activities and events leading up to negotiation can be viewed as an infinite game that has no fixed entities such as personnel, rules, and outcomes. Thus, a critical moment occurs when parties agree to make the transition from some infinite game, like conflict, to the finite game of negotiation. This article explores the conditions leading up to this critical transition and provides two examples of negotiations—one that successfully made the transition and one in which the transition did not occur—to illustrate how these conditions function in actual contexts.