Between the sword and the wall: S pain's limited options for C atalan secessionism

We propose a game theoretical model to assess the capacity of C atalonia to become a recognised, independent country with at least a de facto   E uropean U nion ( EU ) membership. Support for C atalan independence has been increasing for reasons pertaining to identity and economics. S pain can avoid a vote for independence by effectively ‘buying‐out’ a proportion of the C atalan electorate with a funding agreement favourable to C atalonia. If, given the current economic circumstances, the buying‐out strategy is too expensive, a pro‐independence vote is likely to pass. Our model predicts an agreement in which S pain and the EU accommodate C atalan independence in exchange for C atalonia taking a share of the S panish debt. If S pain and the EU do not accommodate, S pain becomes insolvent, which in turn destabilises the EU . The current economic woes of S pain and the EU both contribute to the desire for C atalan independence and make it possible.