Creatio ex nihilo and the Divine Ideas in A quinas: How fair is B ulgakov's critique?

Abstract In this article I engage with S ergei B ulgakov's “sophiological” critique of A quinas's account of creatio ex nihilo and the divine ideas. Bulgakov claims that A quinas's account is insufficiently T rinitarian, too influenced by pagan philosophy, and as such separates the divine will and intellect in such a way as to introduce arbitrariness and instrumentality into the relationship between the divine ideas and creation. I argue that it is inaccurate to characterise A quinas's account of creation and the divine ideas as pagan or non‐ T rinitarian; instead, following A ugustine, A quinas understands the divine ideas as essential to a thoroughly T rinitarian understanding of creation which is necessary to avoid reducing creation to impersonal necessary emanation on the one hand, or an arbitrary act of will on the other. However, I concede that, at times, A quinas's account of the ideas of things which are never created may have opened the door to later more voluntarist and possibilist views.