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Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
Author(s) -
Gow Laura
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12376
Subject(s) - direct and indirect realism , metaphysics , argument (complex analysis) , notice , perception , sensory system , epistemology , essentialism , dilemma , psychology , philosophy , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , medicine , political science , law
David Papineau develops a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own “qualitative view” according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineau's theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality.