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Reply to Laura Gow's critical notice of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
Author(s) -
Papineau David
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12375
Subject(s) - notice , metaphysics , argument (complex analysis) , direct and indirect realism , perception , focus (optics) , epistemology , commit , philosophy of mind , philosophy of language , sensory system , philosophy , psychology , perspective (graphical) , aesthetics , cognitive psychology , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , optics , database , political science , law , artificial intelligence
I am grateful to Laura Gow for her generous and illuminating comments. I will focus on her queries, as this will allow me to elaborate on some points that were treated rather quickly in the book. Gow challenges me on three points. (1) Does my central argument against representationalism about perception commit me to an overly abstract view of properties? (2) What does my view imply about the representational contents of beliefs prompted by sensory experiences? (3) Do I do sufficient justice to the way sensory experience seems representational? I shall consider these in turn.