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Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body
Author(s) -
Blomberg Olle
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12274
Subject(s) - action (physics) , notional amount , psychology , character (mathematics) , joint (building) , virtue , order (exchange) , social psychology , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , epistemology , philosophy , business , architectural engineering , physics , geometry , mathematics , finance , quantum mechanics , engineering
According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of himself or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action, and does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher‐order interlocking intentions.