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Whither extensions?
Author(s) -
Pereplyotchik David
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12271
Subject(s) - objectivity (philosophy) , epistemology , meaning (existential) , linguistics , semantics (computer science) , principle of compositionality , natural language , psychology , philosophy , computer science , programming language
Paul Pietroski develops an iconoclastic account of linguistic meaning. Here, I invite him to say more about what it implies about the relations between language, truth, and conceptual content. Readers concerned with securing the objectivity of conceptual thought may be worried about his claims that typical concepts “have no extensions” and that they “fit one another better than they fit the world.” Others might applaud his anti‐extensionalism in natural‐language semantics but fear that his account re‐raises familiar problems about extensions at the level of psychology.