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Reference and the ambiguity of truth‐value judgments
Author(s) -
Domaneschi Filippo,
Vignolo Massimiliano
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12254
Subject(s) - ambiguity , value (mathematics) , epistemology , truth value , truth condition , psychology , empirical evidence , philosophy , cognitive psychology , computer science , linguistics , machine learning
Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing theories of reference. Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc replied with a survey aimed at providing evidence that referential intuitions are in sync with truth‐value judgments and argued that truth‐value judgments provide empirical data from linguistic usage. We present the results of a survey indicating that Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc's experiment fails to overcome Martí's objection: The truth‐value judgements tested by Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc do not provide data relevant for testing theories of reference.