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Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?
Author(s) -
Bongiorno Federico
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12239
Subject(s) - delusion , capgras syndrome , psychology , subject (documents) , content (measure theory) , character (mathematics) , epistemology , psychoanalysis , philosophy , psychiatry , computer science , mathematical analysis , geometry , mathematics , library science
There is evidence indicating that the Capgras delusion is grounded in some kind of anomalous experience. According to the endorsement model, the content of the delusion is already encoded in the Capgras subject's experience, and the delusion is formed simply by endorsing that content as veridical. Elisabeth Pacherie and Sam Wilkinson have in different ways attempted to articulate a comprehensive defence of this strategy, but here I argue that the endorsement model cannot be defended along the lines envisioned by either of them. I then offer a more promising way of spelling out the model, according to which the anomalous experience implicated in Capgras is metaphorical in character.