Premium
Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology
Author(s) -
Egler Miguel
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12229
Subject(s) - intuition , warrant , phenomenology (philosophy) , metacognition , epistemology , experimental philosophy , empirical research , psychology , philosophy of mind , philosophy of science , cognitive psychology , philosophy , philosophical methodology , cognition , metaphysics , neuroscience , financial economics , economics
Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry.