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Infer with care: A critique of the argument from animals
Author(s) -
Brown Rachael L.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12190
Subject(s) - psychological nativism , argument (complex analysis) , cognition , epistemology , philosophy of mind , psychology , cognitive science , empirical evidence , philosophy , political science , biology , neuroscience , biochemistry , metaphysics , immigration , law
Non‐human animal evidence is frequently invoked in debates in cognitive science. Here, I critically assess one use of such evidence in the form of the “argument from animals,” a prominent positive argument for nativism, which roughly states that non‐human cognitive development is largely nativist, and thus human cognitive development is most likely largely nativist too. I offer a number of reasons to reject this argument, and in doing so derive some important broader lessons concerning the appropriate role of non‐human animal evidence in a science of the human mind.