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Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports
Author(s) -
Openshaw James
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12180
Subject(s) - epistemology , possession (linguistics) , subject (documents) , argument (complex analysis) , principal (computer security) , philosophy , psychology , key (lock) , rebuttal , computer science , law , linguistics , political science , biochemistry , chemistry , computer security , library science , operating system
It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then “acquaintance”‐style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports, which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.