Premium
Knowing the Meaning of a Word: Shared Psychological States and the Determination of Extensions
Author(s) -
Pritchard Timothy
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12134
Subject(s) - extension (predicate logic) , meaning (existential) , possession (linguistics) , word (group theory) , linguistics , epistemology , state (computer science) , psychology , computer science , philosophy , algorithm , programming language
What is it to know the meaning of a word? The traditional view is that it involves the possession of a concept that determines the extension of a word, with the concept corresponding to a single psychological state. Millikan criticizes this view, denying not only that concepts determine extensions but also that sharing a concept means sharing a psychological state. The purpose of this article is to defend a modified version of the traditional view. I argue that Millikan's claims do not translate directly into a thesis about word meaning. Her arguments relate to an extra‐linguistic approach to extension, which we can distinguish from a linguistically oriented notion of extension.