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Defending Simulation Theory Against the Argument from Error
Author(s) -
Short Timothy L.,
Riggs Kevin J.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12103
Subject(s) - simulated reality , theory of mind , argument (complex analysis) , psychology , rational choice theory (criminology) , psychological theory , computer science , cognitive psychology , epistemology , social psychology , cognition , artificial intelligence , philosophy , biochemistry , chemistry , criminology , neuroscience
We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi‐type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges.