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Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology
Author(s) -
Figdor Carrie,
Phelan Mark
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12092
Subject(s) - free will , incompatibilism , compatibilism , moral responsibility , determinism , epistemology , experimental philosophy , moral disengagement , psychology , moral psychology , social psychology , focus (optics) , philosophy , philosophical methodology , physics , optics
Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors (including beliefs about determinism). We also suggest that, in response to some factors, the necessity relation may run from responsibility to free will.