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Evidential Constraints on Singular Thought
Author(s) -
GE JAMES
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12039
Subject(s) - epistemology , instrumentalism , object (grammar) , defeasible estate , cognitivism (psychology) , relation (database) , philosophy of mind , philosophy , metaphysics , cognitive science , intentionality , computer science , psychology , cognition , linguistics , database , neuroscience
In this article, I argue that in typical cases of singular thought, a thinker stands in an evidential relation to the object of thought suitable for providing knowledge of the object's existence. Furthermore, a thinker may generate representations that purport to refer to particular objects in response to appropriate, though defeasible, evidence of the existence of such an object. I motivate these constraints by considering a number of examples introduced by Robin Jeshion in support of a view she calls ‘cognitivism’ (Jeshion, 2010b). Although I agree with Jeshion that acquaintance is not required for all cases of singular thought, I argue that her account doesn't go far enough in rejecting semantic instrumentalism , the view that we can generate singular thoughts arbitrarily, by manipulating the mechanisms of direct reference.