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The Dizzying Turn of Epistemic Contextualism
Author(s) -
Grindrod Jumbly
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/meta.12406
Subject(s) - contextualism , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , focus (optics) , linguistic turn , attribution , philosophy , sociology , psychology , linguistics , social psychology , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , optics , interpretation (philosophy)
The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view—referred to here as the default view —has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.