Literary Intentionalism

In the philosophical debate about literary interpretation, actual intentionalists claim, and anti‐intentionalists deny, that an acceptable interpretation of fictional literature must be constrained by the author's intentions. This paper argues that a close examination of the two most influential recent strands in this debate reveals a surprising convergence. Both sides (a) focus on literary works as they are, where work identity is determined in part by certain (successfully realized) categorial intentions concerning, for example, title, genre, and large‐scale instances of allusion, allegory, and irony, and (b) allow that works can acceptably be interpreted for unintended meanings—since an intentional act can, under a different description, exhibit unintended features. Insofar as both sides do this, they turn out to share the same interpretive policy concerning authorial intention. This suggests that philosophers should shift the interpretation debate away from issues of authorial intention and toward issues about the aims of interpretation.