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Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma
Author(s) -
Melchior Guido
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/meta.12180
Subject(s) - skepticism , closure (psychology) , bootstrapping (finance) , trilemma , computer science , set (abstract data type) , reliability (semiconductor) , epistemology , explicit knowledge , common knowledge (logic) , knowledge management , artificial intelligence , epistemic modal logic , philosophy , mathematics , law , political science , econometrics , economics , programming language , quantum mechanics , monetary economics , multimodal logic , power (physics) , monetary policy , physics , description logic
This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. The article argues that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge, entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism.