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Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study
Author(s) -
Cowie Christopher
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/meta.12159
Subject(s) - internalism and externalism , conservatism , epistemology , normative , consistency (knowledge bases) , action (physics) , philosophy , reading (process) , psychology , political science , law , computer science , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , politics
Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first‐order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to B ernard W illiams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. The article uses this case study to highlight the role of methodological conservatism in contemporary metaethics more generally.