Finite Reasons Without Foundations

This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to P eter K lein's infinitism. The view it develops, F ramework R easons, upholds K lein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness ( PAA ) and avoiding circularity ( PAC ) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for F ramework R easons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to M ichael B ergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity.