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Justifying Desires
Author(s) -
Kriegel Uriah
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/meta.12032
Subject(s) - internalism and externalism , prima facie , action (physics) , epistemology , philosophy , practical reason , psychology , quantum mechanics , physics
Abstract According to an influential conception of reasons for action, the presence of a desire or some other conative state in the agent is a necessary condition for the agent's having a reason for action. This is sometimes known as internalism . This article presents a case for the considerably stronger thesis, which we may call hyper‐internalism , that the presence of a desire is a sufficient condition for the agent's having a (prima facie) reason for action.