K antian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged

R ichard H are argues that the fundamental assumptions of K ant's ethical system should have led K ant to utilitarianism, had K ant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra H are that the gap between K antian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that H are's attempt to bridge the gap between K antian and consequentialist ethics is immune to T immermann's criticisms. Furthermore, the term “ K antian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either “ K antian rationalism” or “ K antian deontology” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into.