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Incompleteness, regularity, and collective preference
Author(s) -
Cato Susumu
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/meca.12276
Subject(s) - impossibility , axiom , preference , mathematical economics , property (philosophy) , revealed preference , economics , variation (astronomy) , completeness (order theory) , mathematics , microeconomics , epistemology , philosophy , political science , geometry , law , mathematical analysis , physics , astrophysics
This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness , a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences make an alternative weakly better than another. Third, we consider coherency conditions for collective preferences; this conditionally requires the existence of comparable pairs in a certain manner. We prove an impossibility result for each condition using Arrovian axioms.

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