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Decisive coalitions and positive responsiveness
Author(s) -
Cato Susumu
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/meca.12180
Subject(s) - transitive relation , social choice theory , axiom , arrow , focus (optics) , monotonic function , mathematical economics , economics , microeconomics , positive economics , social psychology , psychology , computer science , mathematics , combinatorics , mathematical analysis , physics , geometry , optics , programming language
This paper addresses the Arrovian social choice problem. Our focus is the role of positive responsiveness, which requires social judgments to be strongly monotonic with respect to individual judgments. We clarify the structure of decisive coalitions associated with collective choice rules that satisfy positive responsiveness and Arrow's axioms. Transitivity of social preferences is relaxed to quasi‐transitivity or acyclicity.