Premium
A note on endogenous competition mode with managerial‐unionized firms
Author(s) -
Meccheri Nicola,
Fanti Luciano
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/meca.12168
Subject(s) - duopoly , delegation , economics , microeconomics , product differentiation , bargaining power , competition (biology) , product market , wage bargaining , set (abstract data type) , price setting , product (mathematics) , cournot competition , labour economics , wage , incentive , management , ecology , geometry , mathematics , computer science , programming language , biology
We analyse the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. quantity) in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionized labor markets. Depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation, the set of possible outcomes proves to be very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium as well as multiple asymmetric‐type equilibria.